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1. Introduction 
The majority of senior corporate managers around the world consider financial flexibility as 
one of the most important determinants of their capital structure decisions (Graham and 
Harvey, 2001; Bancel and Mittoo, 2004; and Brounen, De Jong and Koedijk, 2006). The 
academic literature argues the motives to attain financial flexibility are related to the future 
ability and need of firms to raise external funds and restructure their financing at low cost 
(see, e.g., DeAngelo and DeAngelo, 2007; Gamba and Triantis, 2008; and Byoun, 2008). 
Firms with financial flexibility enjoy easier access to external capital markets to meet 
funding needs arising from unanticipated earnings shortfalls - and/or new growth 
opportunities - and hence, avoid situations that lead to suboptimal investment and poor 
performance.2 
In this study we empirically investigate the effects of financial flexibility on corporate 
investment and performance over the period 1994-2006 by paying particular attention to the 
East Asian crisis of 1997-1998. Focusing on a crisis period provides us with clear 
advantages. Economic and financial crises clearly represent exogenous shocks to firms’ 
viability, profitability and cash flows, and generally reduce the expected return on 
investment opportunities. Moreover, due to lower asset prices, crises create opportunities for 
firms with the ability to invest (Mitton, 2002; and Byoun and Xu, 2011). To the extent that 
flexible firms are better equipped to cope with the adverse consequences of exogenous 
shocks, a crisis period would allow us to provide stronger tests on the impact of financial 
flexibility on corporate performance and investment policy during the crisis. The main 
hypothesis we investigate in this paper is that, ceteris paribus, the greater a firm’s financial 
flexibility at the onset of the crisis, the less severe the decline in its investment expenditures 
                                                 
2
 Similar views have also been put forward by earlier studies. For example, the pecking order theory of capital 
structure, proposed by Myers (1984) and Myers and Majluf (1984), is based on the assumption that firms 
preserve financial slack to avoid the need for external funds in financing future investment opportunities. Also, 
Froot, Scharfstein and Stein (1993) suggest that firms maintain financial flexibility to avoid the costs of 
underinvestment. 
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and performance during the crisis. Some further analysis, covering the period 1999-2006, 
seeks to address the question of whether such effects persist in the post crisis period.  
Our analysis begins with the construction of simple indicators of financial flexibility. 
Existing studies mainly focus on leverage and cash holdings decisions as ways of preserving 
flexibility, though these policies are generally considered separately.3 Only recently have 
studies adopted the view that firms can attain financial flexibility through both their debt 
financing and cash holdings policies.4 By drawing insights from these studies and noting that 
firms can attain financial flexibility through alternative routes (e.g. by accumulating cash, 
adopting a conservative leverage policy or adjusting simultaneously their cash and leverage 
levels), we classify firms into several groups of financial flexibility on the basis of their 
leverage and cash holding positions during the pre crisis period. We then examine whether 
firms that attain financial flexibility in the pre crisis period benefit from it by having a 
greater ability to take investment opportunities during the crisis period. A similar analysis is 
conducted for the post crisis period using lagged values for leverage and cash to measure 
financial flexibility. 
To address the relationship between financial flexibility and investment we estimate 
cash flow sensitivities using the investment equation framework commonly used in the 
literature (see e.g. Fazzari, Hubbard and Petersen, 1988; Hubbard, Kashyap and Whited, 
1995; Cleary, 2006; and Carpenter and Guariglia, 2008 among others). However, our 
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 A number of studies emphasize the importance of obtaining financial flexibility through low leverage policies 
(Goldstein, Ju and Leland, 2001; Billet, King and Mauer, 2007; Byoun, 2008; Lins, Servaes and Tufano, 2010; 
and Campello, Graham and Harvey, 2010) or moderate/high cash balances (Opler et al., 1999; Billet and 
Garfinkel, 2004; Almeida, Campello and Weisbach, 2004; Acharya, Almeida and Campello, 2007; Faulkender 
and Wang, 2006; Dittmar and Mahrt-Smith, 2007; Kalcheva and Lins, 2007; Berrospide, Purnanandam and 
Rajan, 2008; Harford, Mansi and Maxwell, 2008; and Riddick and Whited, 2008). The main argument of both 
lines of research is that firms with readily available large cash balances or low leverage can better cope with 
earnings shortfalls and hence avoid underinvestment.  
4
 For example, DeAngelo and DeAngelo (2007) explicitly consider leverage and cash holdings to define 
financial flexibility and argue that low leverage combined with moderate cash holdings and high dividend 
payouts constitute an optimal policy regarding flexibility. In line with this view, Gamba and Triantis (2008) 
show that financial flexibility can be a result of the firm’s strategic decisions regarding its capital structure, 
liquidity and investment. Moreover, in the light of increased risk in the economic environment, Bates, Kahle 
and Stulz (2008) argue that high cash holdings are related to low levels of debt and hence the simultaneous 
practice of these policies enable firms to forestall distress and default. Finally, Byoun (2008) reports that small 
developing firms are more likely to seek financial flexibility and do so through lower leverage and larger cash 
holdings policies. 
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emphasis is similar to that in recent studies that attempt to provide insights into the effects of 
supply-side shocks on corporate investment (see Duchin, Ozbas and Sensoy, 2010). We also 
examine whether the performance of firms with greater flexibility differs from that of less 
flexible firms. By doing so, our study adds to the literature that investigates the effects of 
financial crises on corporate performance and contributes to the recent research on the value 
of financial flexibility (see e.g., Gamba and Triantis, 2008; Byoun, 2008; Byoun, 2011). For 
example, prior studies of the East Asian crisis present strong evidence for the importance of 
several firm characteristics, such as ownership structure and corporate governance, in 
determining corporate performance (see, e.g., Johnson et. al, 2000; Mitton, 2002; Fisman, 
2002; and Lemmon and Lins, 2003). Our analysis builds on these studies by putting a 
specific focus on the potential role that financial flexibility might play for corporate 
valuation during the crisis. 
Finally, drawing on recent findings showing strong inter-relations across several 
indicators of financial constraints and financial health (see, e.g., Cleary, 2006; Carpenter and 
Guariglia, 2008), our study also examines how traditional measures of financial constraints, 
such as dividend, firm size, firm age and business group affiliation, interact with the 
flexibility indicators utilized in this study. To this end, we evaluate the relative importance of 
traditional measures of financing constraints and leverage-based and cash-based flexibility 
indicators in explaining corporate investment and performance. By doing so, our study also 
contributes to the rich literature that examines whether large investment to cash flow 
sensitivities can be treated as evidence of financing frictions (see, e.g., Fazzari, Hubbard and 
Petersen, 1988; Kaplan and Zingales, 1997; Cleary, 1999; Guariglia, 2008; Pindado, 
Requejo and de la Torre, 2011).  
Our empirical analyses provide several important findings. First, flexible firms seem to 
have greater capacity to pursue growth opportunities in the face of unanticipated earnings 
shortfalls during the crisis. Second, between the two components of flexibility, namely cash 
and leverage, leverage seems to be the main driver of investment behaviour during the crisis 
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period. Our results suggest that it is more likely that cash is mainly held as a form of 
insurance against financial distress and bankruptcy. Third, companies cannot solely rely on a 
business group affiliation to hedge against uncertain future contingencies. Fourth, financial 
flexibility not only leads to higher investment expenditures and lower investment cash flow 
sensitivity but also to better performance during the crisis. Interestingly, we do not observe 
any significant differences in terms of investment level and cash flow sensitivity to 
investment between flexible and inflexible firms in the post crisis period. This suggests that 
the value of financial flexibility is higher during abnormal periods of the economic cycle. 
Finally, our results, which go through a battery of robustness checks, demonstrate that cash 
and leverage policies of flexible firms in the pre crisis period are neither random nor driven 
by constraints arising from capital market imperfections.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 describes the data and provides 
summary statistics. Section 3 provides a detailed analysis regarding the role of financial 
flexibility in determining corporate investment. Section 4 investigates the relationship 
between financial flexibility and corporate performance, and Section 5 provides a series of 
robustness tests. Finally, Section 6 concludes.   
 
2. Data and Descriptive Statistics 
Our analysis to examine the value of financial flexibility is based on a sample of 1,068 listed 
firms from the following countries: Hong Kong, Indonesia, Malaysia, South Korea, and 
Thailand. This list of countries includes the four most affected Asian economies plus Hong 
Kong, a key market in the region that was generally less affected by the crisis than others but 
was still subject to some large shocks due to the openness of its economy and its close 
relationship with the other East Asian economies. Given our objective to emphasize on the 
East Asian crisis of 1997-1998, we exclude from the analysis Philippines, Singapore and 
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Taiwan as they account for three of the mildly affected countries from crisis, in contrast to 
the severely affected other East Asian countries (see Winters, 1999).5  
Our dataset is constructed using data from several sources. Specifically, we obtain data 
on accounting and market variables from Thomson Datastream. The dataset covers pre crisis 
(i.e. 1994 to 1996), crisis (i.e. 1997 to 1998) and post crisis (1999-2006) periods.6 To select 
the sample of firms, we drop financial firms and delete firm year observations with missing 
data and extreme values for our regression variables (on the basis of the top and bottom 1%). 
Finally, we keep in the sample only those firms that are traceable during the sample period. 
These criteria led to a final sample of 1,068 firms. We match firms in this sample with those 
from the study of Claessens, Djankov and Lang (2000) to obtain information on business 
group affiliation, the magnitude of separation between cash flow and control rights, the 
identity of the largest shareholder, and the role of CEOs and other senior managers as 
controlling shareholders of the company. These data are of either December 1996 or the end 
of the fiscal year 1996, which is just before the start of the crisis in East Asia.7 Finally, given 
the cross country nature of our study, we also consider a country based rule of law measure 
that ranges from 0 to 10, with lower scores corresponding to less tradition for law and order. 
This measure is based on an assessment of the law and order tradition in a country as 
produced by the country risk taking agency International Country Risk (ICR).8  
[Insert TABLE 1 about here] 
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 Characteristically, between July-November 1997, both Taiwan and Singapore had a current account surplus of 
more than 10 percent and Philippines had almost no deficit although the other countries in the region had a 
current account deficit of more than 10 percent on average. Also, between May 1997 and May 1998 Taiwan 
was the only East Asian country for which the average daily change in its stock market was not negative (see 
also Radelet and Sachs, 1998 and Nixson and Walters, 1999). 
6
 To identify the pre crisis, crisis and post crisis periods we follow earlier studies on the subject (see e.g., Lee 
and Song, 2011; Claessens, Fan and Lang, 2006; and Lemmon and Lins, 2003). For robustness purposes we 
also adjust the pre crisis, crisis and post crisis periods to 1995-1997, 1998-1999 and 2000-2007 respectively, 
for Hong Kong. This helps control for the fact that the crisis occurred in Hong Kong with some delay (see e.g. 
Radelet and Sachs, 1998; Nixson and Walters, 1999; and Lam, Li and So, 2010). The results are not affected 
significantly.  
7
 Ownership data cannot be obtained for a small number of firms in our sample. This should not bias, however, 
our results in a particular manner as there are no statistically significant differences, with respect to their key 
characteristics, between East Asian firms with and without ownership data at a particular point of time (see 
Lins, 2003 and Lemmon and Lins, 2003).   
8
 See also La Porta et al. (1998).  
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Table 1 summarizes the basic descriptive statistics for the key variables of the study 
using the whole sample, reported separately for the pre crisis, crisis and post crisis periods 
(Panels A, B and C respectively). We start with analyzing the changes in the statistics of the 
key variables from the pre crisis to the crisis period. In general, the statistics differ 
significantly across the two sub-periods. For example, the mean value of investment 
expenditures of firms drops from 8.1 percent in the pre crisis period to about 4.15 percent 
during the crisis, which represents 48 percent decrease. Not surprisingly, the average cash 
flow ratio also drops by about 31 percent, from 9.99 to 6.91 percent. Furthermore, both 
growth opportunities, measured by the market to book ratio, and firm size get smaller during 
the crisis period, with the average values of the market to book ratio and the logarithm of 
total assets (expressed in US dollars) dropping from 1.57 to 1.19, and 12.44 to 12.33, 
respectively. Additionally, the crisis leads firms to significantly reduce their dividend payout 
ratios by about 37 percent (from 2.01 to 1.27 percent). Turning to the changes in the cash 
holding and leverage ratios of firms, we find that the cash holdings ratio of the average firm 
in our sample remains almost unchanged during the crisis period at about 11 percent. 
However, the change in the average value of leverage is significant, increasing from 29.25 
percent in the pre crisis period to 34.67 percent in the crisis period, corresponding to an 18.5 
percent increase. In Table 1 we also report the changes in the net debt ratio, defined as total 
debt minus cash holdings, divided by total assets. In line with the findings regarding 
leverage and cash holdings, there is an increase in net debt during the crisis, which is mainly 
driven by the increase in leverage.  
The findings regarding leverage and net debt ratios are at odds with the view that the 
average debt level usually drops during a crisis period as a response to the increase in 
uncertainty and asymmetric information between borrowers and lenders. As we discuss later 
in Section 3, however, on closer inspection it appears that there are two groups of firms in 
our sample that behave differently with respect to their capital structure decision. On the one 
hand, a large proportion of firms, mainly those that adopt aggressive leverage policies in the 
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pre crisis period, experience difficulties to increase their leverage during the crisis period. 
On the other hand, consistent with our expectations, firms that adopt conservative policies in 
normal times (e.g. by retaining leverage at relatively low levels) indicate a higher ability to 
raise external financing in abnormal times.  
Moving to the transition from the crisis to the post crisis period, we do not observe any 
significant changes to the levels of capital expenditures, cash flow, firm size and asset 
tangibility. However, there is a notable increase in the levels of cash holding where the 
average (median) value increases from 11.14 (7.2) percent in the crisis period to 12.71 (8.81) 
percent in the post crisis period. A year-by-year analysis suggests a consistent increase to the 
median level of cash holdings from about 7.60 percent in 1999 to 10.03 percent in 2006. 
This confirms the recent findings of Lee and Song (2011) for eight East Asian countries and 
is also in line with the strong precautionary motive for cash after crisis periods (see Lee and 
Song, 2011; and Almeida et al., 2004). The increase in cash holdings, accompanied by the 
large percentage drop in leverage, leads to a substantially lower net-debt ratio of 12.79 
percent for East Asian firms in the post crisis period. Finally, the post crisis average dividend 
ratio seems to revert to its pre-crisis level of about 2 percent.   
 
3. Financial Flexibility and Corporate Investment 
This section provides more detailed descriptive statistics by dividing firms into subsamples 
on the basis of their cash and leverage positions in the pre crisis period. Initially, by using 
the median values of cash holdings and leverage ratios of firms during the pre crisis period, 
we generate four subsamples of firms, (1) low leverage (LL); (2) high leverage (HL); (3) low 
cash (LC); and (4) high cash (HC) firms.9 Additionally, we identify two further groups of 
firms, (5) low leverage and high cash (LL-HC); and (6) high leverage and low cash (HL-LC) 
firms, by considering both policies simultaneously. Later, we provide the mean values of the 
                                                 
9
 In a series of robustness checks that are analytically discussed in Section 5, we use industry-adjusted median 
values for cash and leverage as well as different cut-off points (e.g. the 25th and the 75th percentiles) for 
classifying firms into different categories. Our results, which are discussed analytically in Section 5, remain 
robust across the different classifications.  
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main variables of interest in each subsample and compare them across the pre crisis and the 
crisis periods. 
 
3.1 Financial flexibility by low leverage 
Panel A.1 of Table 2 presents the average values of the key firm characteristics of the 
leverage subgroups of firms in the pre crisis period. There are several important observations 
that are of particular interest. First, in line with earlier findings in the literature, HL firms 
have lower cash holdings than LL firms. Second, the average HL firm invests more than the 
average LL firm in the pre crisis period, which may look surprising given that growth 
opportunities, proxied by the market to book ratio, and the cash flow ratio of HL firms are 
lower than the corresponding values for LL firms. Third, we find that HL firms are on 
average larger than LL firms. Overall, the firm characteristics during the pre crisis period 
suggest that HL firms are on average larger, have lower growth opportunities, cash holdings 
and cash flows. However, their investment expenditures are higher than those of the LL 
firms. 
[Insert TABLE 2 about here] 
In Panel B.1 we present the summary statistics of the same variables during the crisis 
period. In line with the argument that financially flexible firms have greater capacity to 
invest, LL firms seem to be more flexible than HL firms, suggested by their higher 
investment to assets ratio in the crisis period. The investment ratio for the average LL firm is 
about 4.56 percent whereas it is 3.73 percent for the average HL firm. As explained above, 
the pre crisis results suggest an opposite pattern. The corresponding percentage decreases in 
the investment ratio from the pre crisis to the crisis period, presented in Table 3, are about 56 
and 40 percent for HL and LL firms respectively.   
Comparing the mean values of other variables also leads to interesting inferences. HL 
firms are on average larger, have much more debt with lower growth opportunities and cash 
flows, and hold lower cash balances than LL firms during the crisis. However, a closer 
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inspection of the changes in the average values in the crisis period reveals a more striking 
picture. We observe that the changes in the cash holdings ratio of both HL and LL firms are 
negligible. However, the changes in the leverage ratio in the crisis period are significant 
where LL firms increase their leverage ratio during the crisis by about 44 percent whereas 
the increase in leverage by HL firms is limited to only about 9 percent. These findings imply 
that the net debt ratio of LL (HL) firms increases by 351 (10.5) percent from about 2.3 
(33.97) percent to 10.2 (37.54) percent. There is strong evidence that LL firms of the pre 
crisis period are able to increase their leverage significantly in the crisis period and this 
probably enables them to maintain a higher level of investment expenditures than those of 
HL firms. We also check the debt maturity structure of HL and LL firms. The results 
indicate that the ratio of short term debt to total debt increases (decreases) for HL (LL) firms, 
suggesting that the increase in the leverage ratio of HL firms during the crisis is mainly 
maintained through short term debt. On the contrary, LL firms, despite the increase in their 
leverage ratio by almost 44 percent, are able to slightly reduce the share of short term debt in 
total debt by 1.26 percent (from 63.55 to 62.75).   
In panel C.1 of Table 2 we report the summary statistics of HL and LL groups in the 
post crisis period. We find that LL firms invest slightly less than HL firms (4.01 percent vs. 
4.27 percent), which represents a 14.48 percent increase for HL firms and 12.06 percent 
decrease for LL firms compared to their investment level prevailing during the crisis (see 
Table 3, Panel B). This evidence does not support the view that financial flexibility provides 
firms with the ability to invest more. Rather, LL firms seem to reduce their investment 
expenditures in the post crisis period, which may be explained by the moderate level of MTB 
(a proxy of growth opportunities). Also, HL firms have a leverage ratio of 41.98 percent, 
which is close to its pre-crisis level. This represents a 9.33 percent decrease compared to the 
leverage ratio in the crisis period. On the contrary, LL firms seem to adopt a different 
strategy in the post crisis period by reducing their leverage ratio to 9.16 percent from 23.07 
percent, representing about a 60 percent drop). Such leverage level is considerably lower 
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than the 23.07 percent prevailing during the crisis period. Likewise, LL firms increase their 
cash holding in the post crisis period by 25.85 percent (from 13.50 to 16.99 percent) while 
HL firms reduce it by about 2.28 percent (from 8.76 to 8.56 percent).  
 Overall, the descriptive statistics discussed in this section provide preliminary 
evidence consistent with the view that maintaining debt at low levels enables firms to 
preserve debt capacity to fund investment opportunities in the face of unanticipated adverse 
shocks. However, such effect is prevalent only during the crisis period.  
 
3.2 Financial flexibility by high cash balances 
In this section we examine firm characteristics of the two subgroups of firms, grouped on the 
basis of their cash balances in the pre crisis period. We start by comparing high cash (HC) 
and low cash (LC) firms in the pre crisis period, presented in Panel A.2 of Table 2. The 
results suggest that the average net debt ratio of HC firms is only about 7.14 percent 
compared with 29.01 percent net debt ratio for LC firms. HC and the LC firms also differ 
significantly in several other characteristics in this period. For example, HC firms have 
greater cash flow to assets and market to book ratios. The differences are also statistically 
significant. Nevertheless, the investment ratio does not differ significantly across the two 
groups, and HC and LC firms are similar in size. Furthermore, the difference between the 
maturity structures of debt holdings of each group of firms is not statistically significant and 
about 60 percent of total debt for the average firm in both groups matures within one year. 
 In Panel B.2 of Table 2 we present the summary statistics of the two groups in the 
crisis period. The findings are very similar to those reported above for the pre crisis period. 
That is, compared to LC firms, HC firms have higher cash flow and market to book ratios, 
hold less debt in their capital structures, and pay more dividends. Moreover, the investment 
expenditures, size and the debt maturity structure of debt are similar for both groups. It is, 
however, important to note that although the difference is not statistically significant and 
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both groups drop their investment expenditures substantially, the average investment ratio of 
HC firms is now greater than that of LC firms in the crisis period.  
[Insert TABLE 3 about here] 
 Moving to Table 3 (panel A), we find that both HC and LC firms increase their 
leverage ratio during the crisis, by 21.59 and 16.45 percent respectively. However, HC firms 
reduce the cash to assets ratio by 18.13 percent whereas LC firms increase it by 84.33 
percent. These changes result in a significant increase in the net debt ratio of HC firms by 
nearly 125 percent and a small change of 7.4 percent for LC firms. Finally, both groups of 
firms reduce their investment expenditures substantially in the crisis period. The percentage 
drop in the investment to assets ratios for HC and LC firms are 46.08 and 51.47 percent 
respectively. Overall, the results reported in this subsection provide little evidence 
supporting the view that large cash balances provide firms with greater financial flexibility. 
In Panel C.2 of Table 2 we present the summary statistics of HC and LC groups in 
the post crisis period. The results suggest that flexibility attained by cash reserves does not 
matter much for investment in the post crisis period.  In particular, HC and LC firms retain 
their crisis investment levels, at about 4.3 and 3.9 percent respectively), over the period 
1999-2006. We also find that while HC firms increase their cash holding and reduce their 
leverage substantially (at 21.56 and 19.34 percent respectively), LC firms reduce their cash 
further (at 3.86 percent) and reduce their leverage to a much lower extent (at 31.86%). This 
supports Lee and Song’s (2011) view that the crisis has substantially changed firm’s cash 
holding policies (see changes in cash for HC and LC firms in Table 3 (Panel A vs. Panel B)).   
 
3.3 Financial flexibility by low leverage and high cash balances 
Despite its useful insights, the analysis in the previous two subsections can be misleading 
given that it is based on a univariate setting and considers the cash and leverage positions of 
firms separately in grouping firms into different groups. Corporate cash and leverage 
decisions, however, are strongly interrelated in the sense that an adjustment in one policy 
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variable implies that other policy variables must also adjust (see Gatchev, Pulvino and 
Tarhan, 2010). As a result, firms may choose to attain financial flexibility by simultaneously 
maintaining low leverage and high cash policies. We take this view into consideration by 
regrouping firms in Tables 2 and 3 on the basis of both policies, and we compare the 
characteristics of low leverage-high cash (LL-HC) vs. high leverage-low cash (HL-LC) 
firms. We expect LL-HC firms to be more financially flexible than HL-LC firms in funding 
investment expenditures during the crisis period.  
 We start by assessing the differences in firm characteristics in the pre crisis period, 
shown in Panel A.3. By construction, HL-LC firms have higher leverage and lower cash 
holdings than LL-HC firms. However, their cash flow to assets and market to book ratios are 
lower than those of LL-HC firms. Additionally, compared to LL-HC firms, they are smaller, 
hold less short term debt in their capital structures, and pay out lower dividends relative to 
their total assets. More importantly, the average HL-LC firm invests more than the average 
LL-HC firm in the pre crisis period, though the difference is statistically significant only at 
the 10 percent level.  
 We now turn to the statistics in the crisis period and the percentage changes in the 
mean values across the two periods, reported in Panel B.3 of Table 2 and in Table 3 
respectively. The comparative characteristics of firms in the two groups are very similar to 
those reported above for the pre crisis period. The only striking exception relates to the 
investment to assets ratio. In the crisis period, LL-HC firms have a greater investment ratio 
than that of HL-LC firms, given by 4.67 and 3.65 percent respectively. The corresponding 
figures for the pre crisis period are 7.52 and 8.42 percent. That is, the findings reveal that, as 
reported in Table 3, the investment ratio of LL-HC firms dropped by 37.9 percent whereas 
the decrease for HL-LC firms is 56.65 percent. Interestingly, the 56.65 percent drop in 
investment is the highest across all the subgroups in our sample.  
Furthermore, HL-LC firms display the lowest rise in the net debt ratio, which 
increases in the crisis period only by 1.64 percent. Table 3 also reveals that HL-LC firms 
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drop their dividend payout ratio by 55.75 percent and increase their leverage ratio by only 
7.32 percent. By contrast, LL-HC firms during the same period reduce their dividend 
payouts and cash holdings by 26.55 and 16.69 percent respectively, and increase their 
leverage ratio by 41.76 percent. The net debt ratio hence increases significantly, by more 
than 150 percent. The resulting drop of 37.9 percent in the investment ratio of LL-HC firms 
is the lowest among the subgroups included in Table 3.  
In Panel C.3 of Table 2 we present the summary statistics of LL-HC and HL-LC 
firms in the post crisis period. The results reveal that both LL-HC and HL-LC firms have 
similar investment ratios at 4.19 and 4.11 percent respectively, which are not statistically 
different. Comparison of these findings with those for the crisis period further reinforces the 
argument that financial flexibility may not be an important determinant of investment during 
normal times. Interestingly, while flexible firms reduce their investment expenditures in 
relation to their total assets, less flexible firms are able to increase investment during the 
years following the crisis period (as shown in Panel B of Table 3). It seems that flexible 
firms of the pre crisis period (i.e. LL-HC firms) revert to being cautious by building up more 
flexibility in the post crisis period. They reduce their investment by 10.28 percent during the 
post crisis period. This view is also supported by the fact that LL-HC firms substantially 
reduce their net debt ratio to the level of -16.5 percent, which represents a huge decline of 
about 600 percent. On the contrary, HL-LC firms maintain a net debt ratio of 39.54 percent, 
which is similar to the one prevailing in the pre crisis and crisis periods (39.85 and 40.23 
percent respectively).  Overall, our findings provide suggestive evidence that firms 
combining low leverage with high cash balances in the pre crisis period are better positioned 
to maintain their investment expenditures during the crisis period. However, financial 
flexibility is less of an important determinant of investment during the post crisis period.  
 
 
 
 16 
3.4 Financial flexibility and the cash flow sensitivity of investment 
The evidence provided so far suggests that the investment expenditures of firms with low 
levels of debt and large cash balances are less sensitive to unanticipated negative shocks to 
earnings. In this section, we examine this issue further in a multivariate framework. Our 
empirical strategy is to estimate an investment model for different subgroups of firms, where 
the subgroups are determined on the basis of firms’ past leverage and cash positions. Our 
main objective in this section is to examine the extent to which the cash flow sensitivity of 
investment varies across the subgroups in the pre crisis, crisis and post crisis periods. Based 
on the evidence reported in the previous section we argue that LL firms are more financially 
flexible in funding investment than HL firms. Similarly, LL-HC firms are believed to be 
more flexible than HL-LC firms in the sample. Thus, we use the terms LL, LL-HC and 
flexible, and the terms HL, HL-LC and less flexible interchangeably throughout our 
empirical analysis.  
 In line with prior research, the cash flow ratio is used as a proxy for the availability 
of internal sources for investment.10 We expect that less flexible firms are more dependent 
on the level of cash flows for funding investment because of their limited ability to raise 
external finance. We estimate the cash flow sensitivity of investment using the following 
model: 
                        it
r
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In equation (1), I is the ratio of capital expenditures to lagged total assets, CFLOW is the 
sum of earnings before interest, tax and depreciation over total assets and MTB represents 
the firm’s growth opportunities, measured by the market to book ratio. In an attempt to use a 
proxy that properly controls for growth opportunities, we decompose the market to book 
ratio into two parts - a fundamental component (MTBf) and a residual component (MTBr) - 
and then examine how investment responds to changes in these two components. We 
                                                 
10
 See Fazzari et al.,(1988); Hubbard et al., (1995); and Gilchrist and Himmelberg, (1998) for a discussion on 
the use of the investment cash flow sensitivity as a proxy for financial constraints.  
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consider that such decomposition is necessary because stock valuations tend to deviate 
significantly from fundamentals in periods characterized by asset price shocks.11 In 
estimating equation (1), we initially use a random effects GLS regression approach in which 
independent variables are lagged one year to control for potential endogeneity problems (see 
Duchin et al., 2010).  
For the estimation of the random effects model, one can assume both cross-sectional 
and time heterogeneity. We put forward several alternative one-way specifications and use 
the standard Breusch-Pagan Lagrange multiplier (LM) test for random effects with the null 
hypothesis that variances of groups (e.g. across time periods or across firms) are zero. The 
null hypothesis is rejected when cross-sectional heterogeneity is allowed for, while it cannot 
be rejected when time effects are allowed for. This is probably due to the structure of our 
data (i.e. we estimate our investment models separately for three sub-periods, which 
minimizes the importance of time effects). As a result, we estimate a one-way random 
effects model allowing for firm rather than time heterogeneity. 
For completeness, we also obtain results by estimating a fixed effects model. The 
rationale behind the implementation of the latter method is that better companies may 
anticipate a downturn in their conditions and hence prepare for it. To this end, firm-specific 
fixed effects may be important in our investment framework.12 Equation (1) is estimated for 
flexible and less flexible firms in the pre crisis, crisis and post crisis periods.13 
                                                 
11
 To decompose the market to book ratio we follow a similar approach to that of Goyal and Yamada’s (2004). 
Specifically, we regress the MTB ratio against contemporary and lagged sales growth, squared sales growth and 
industry dummies. The fitted values of this regression are used as a proxy for the fundamental component of 
stock valuations (MTBf), while the residual component is used as a proxy for the residual values (MTBr). The 
inclusion of both components of MTB in the regressions helps capture not only outsiders’ but also insiders’ 
evaluation of growth opportunities. Alternative ways to avoid the mismeasurement of the proxy of growth 
opportunities include: i) the use of contracted capital expenditures alongside MTB in the model (see Carpenter 
and Guariglia, 2008) and ii) the use of an error-correction specification (see Guariglia, 2008). Notwithstanding 
their merit, these methods cannot be utilized in our study due to the nature of our data (e.g. a short-panel) and 
the lack of availability of information on contracted expenditures. We therefore stick to Goyal and Yamada’s 
(2004) method to tackle the measurement issue of growth opportunities. Other more straightforward variables 
that have been suggested as proxies for growth opportunities (e.g. ratio of R&D expenses to total sales) cannot 
be implemented in our analysis given the limited data availability (e.g. for the case of Korea, only 10% of the 
companies included in our sample disclosed to their R&D expenditures for the year 1998).  
12
 We control for fixed effects in order to capture unobserved factors that are not taken into account by the 
model described by Equation (1). The results of the fixed effects model are very similar to the ones obtained 
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3.4.1 Baseline Investment Results 
We start by estimating equation (1) using the whole sample without distinguishing between 
flexible and less flexible firms (Model 1 in Table 4). The estimated coefficient of cash flow 
is positive and statistically significant across all periods. The cash flow sensitivity of 
investment, however, is much lower during the crisis period than the pre crisis period (0.289 
vs. 0.087). This finding is possibly attributable to the fact that while cash flow drops 
substantially during the crisis for almost all firms, a specific group of firms seem to manage 
to retain their investment at satisfactory levels by raising external financing (e.g. drawing-
down pre-arranged lines of credit).14 The cash flow sensitivity of investment increases to the 
level of 0.129 in the post crisis period.  
[Insert TABLE 4 about here] 
The results also show that during the pre crisis period that the estimated coefficients of 
both components (fundamental MTBf and residual MTBr) of the market to book ratio are 
economically and statistically insignificant, though they become significant during the crisis 
and post crisis periods. Although we do not investigate this further, a possible explanation 
relates to the overinvestment tendency of firms during economic booms (Hadlock, 1998; and 
                                                                                                                                                      
using the random effects estimator. We therefore decide to report only those results that are based on the 
random-effects estimator (all unreported results are available upon request by the authors).  
13
 Recent studies on the inter-temporal nature of financial decisions (see Gatchev et al., 2010) suggest that the 
lagged value of investment should be included in equation (1). However, it is difficult to estimate a well-
specified dynamic model using short panels such as ours. Specifically, the requirement to use lagged values of 
the dependent and independent variables as instruments makes it difficult to estimate such model separately for 
all three periods under investigation (pre-crisis, crisis and post crisis) and hence produce directly comparable 
results.   Still, in the spirit of Pindado et al. (2011), we perform a GMM estimation using all firms over the 
entire sample period (1994-2006). The results show that the adjustment coefficient (given by 1 minus the 
coefficient of the lagged dependent variable) is 0.665, which is quite high. One possible explanation for the 
high value of the adjustment coefficient might be that the costs of deviating from the target are significant, 
supporting the argument that corporate investment expenditures are persistent over time and firms attempt to 
sustain their existing policies. We therefore conclude that the substantial differences in terms of investment 
level and cash flow sensitivity to investment between flexible and inflexible firms in the crisis period, as 
identified using a specific empirical framework, are less likely to be random and more likely to reflect 
unexpected changes in the availability of financing.Based on this evidence, we conclude that although our 
investment framework is not flawless, it seems appropriate for studying the impact of financial flexibility on 
investment for the specific sample/time-period.  
14
 Another potential explanation for the declining cash flow sensitivity of investment across time relates to the 
life cycle hypothesis (see Hovakimian, 2009). According to the lifecycle hypothesis, young firms usually have 
low cash flows but relatively high investment expenditures due to the existence of abundant investment 
opportunities. However, as they become more mature they experience increasing cash flow with 
simultaneously decreasing investment rates, leading to a lower cash flow sensitivity of investment.  
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Wei and Zhang, 2008), which possibly weakens the link between growth opportunities and 
investment. This is also consistent with our earlier descriptive analysis reporting that the 
investment expenditures and cash flows of firms are at record high levels in the pre crisis 
period despite a modest average market to book ratio of 1.57.15 The descriptive statistics for 
the post crisis period shows that the levels of investment and market to book ratio do not 
revert to their pre-crisis levels during the post-crisis period.  
We next estimate the investment model through grouping firms into flexible and less 
flexible subsamples on the basis of their leverage behaviour in the pre crisis period. The 
results are reported in Models 2 and 3. The most striking finding from these estimations 
relates to the investment cash flow sensitivity coefficient. For high leverage (HL) and hence 
less flexible firms, the estimated coefficient on CFLOW is positive and statistically 
significant in both periods. However, in Model 3, which refers to low leverage firms (i.e. 
LL), the coefficient on CFLOW becomes insignificant in the crisis period, though it remains 
highly statistically significant in the pre crisis period. In terms of economic significance, 
while the coefficient for HL firms drops from 0.273 in the pre crisis period to 0.114 during 
the crisis period, the drop in the economic significance for LL firms is much bigger, from 
0.369 in the pre crisis to 0.038 during the crisis period. Our results also indicate that despite 
the irrelevance of the market to book ratio in determining the investment expenditures of LL 
firms in the pre crisis period, the coefficients on the market to book variables in the crisis 
period switch signs and become positive and significant at the 1 percent level. In summary, 
these findings are consistent with the view that financial flexibility can be attained through a 
low leverage policy. Importantly, it seems that flexible firms rely less on internal resources 
(i.e. cash flow) for investing. Moreover, such firms are better equipped to meet financing 
needs though external financing and hence have a greater ability to undertake valuable 
growth opportunities that arise during the crisis. Interestingly, leverage does not seem to 
                                                 
15
 The weak relation can also be due to the poor empirical performance of q models especially when estimated 
adjustment costs are excessively large (see, Chirinko, 1993 for further discussion on the performance of q-
models which explicitly underline that due to noise in stock markets Tobin’s Q is not necessarily equivalent to 
growth opportunities for firms). Our specification (see Eq. 1) may help alleviate such problem.  
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significantly affect the cash flow sensitivity of investment in the post crisis period. The cash 
flow coefficient of the variable cash flow is positive and statistically significant for both HL 
and LL firms. The two cash flow sensitivities are also very similar in their magnitude (0.137 
vs. 0.126 respectively). 
We next carry out the same analysis using firms’ cash holdings to distinguish the 
financially flexible firms from the less flexible ones. Specifically, as shown in Models 4 and 
5, the cash flow sensitivity of investment for both flexible (HC) and less flexible (LC) firms 
is positive and significant during both pre crisis and crisis periods. The values of the 
estimated coefficients on CFLOW, however, drop significantly during the crisis, whereas the 
economic significance of the market to book variables improves significantly especially for 
the flexible firms. More importantly, in contrast to leverage, cash does not seem to 
significantly affect the cash flow sensitivity of investment during the crisis period. As for the 
post crisis period, cash holdings do not seem to significantly affect the cash flow sensitivity 
of investment with both sensitivities being positive and statistically significant. 
In models (6) and (7) we estimate the investment equation after combining both cash 
and leverage through assigning firms into flexible (LL-HC) and less flexible (HL-LC) 
categories. The results are similar to those reported in Models 2 and 3 where low leverage is 
used to construct our flexibility proxy. The investment of flexible firms during the crisis 
does not depend on the level of cash flow and, as expected, is determined by the availability 
of valuable investment opportunities. However, this is not the case for less flexible firms as 
indicated by the positive and significant coefficient on CFLOW. It is important to note that 
adding cash holdings as an additional criterion in identifying financially flexible firms does 
not change the results significantly in either periods, where the results seem to be driven 
mostly by the leverage positions of firms prior to the crisis. Once again, the post crisis 
results are considerably different compared to the crisis ones, showing a similar cash flow 
sensitivity of investment for LL-HC and HL-LC firms (0.111 and 0.145 respectively). Also, 
both coefficients are statistically significant at the 1 percent level.    
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In Models (8) and (9), we re-estimate Models (6) and (7) after excluding negative cash 
flow observations from the sample. As Allayannis and Mozumdar (2004) and Bhagat, 
Moyen and Suh (2005) suggest, negative cash flow observations may bias the results of an 
investment model. This is because investment expenditures are unlikely to respond to cash 
flow changes when companies are in sufficiently bad shape. To address this issue, we 
identify and delete all negative firm year observations as a result of this check. However, our 
results, reported in Models 8 and 9, remain very similar, suggesting that they are not biased 
by the presence of negative cash flow firm year observations in our sample.16  
Overall, the results presented in Table 4 are consistent with the hypothesis that 
financial flexibility is desirable to fund future growth opportunities when firms find external 
finance more costly and/or experience cash flow shortfalls.17 Prior to the crisis and in the 
post crisis period it is difficult to distinguish between the investment behaviour of flexible 
and inflexible firms but their behaviour becomes distinct during the crisis. More specifically, 
firms attaining financial flexibility through low leverage in the pre crisis period do not rely 
on the availability of internal funds to finance their capital expenditures during the crisis. 
The main determinant of investment of flexible firms during the crisis period is their growth 
opportunities. On the contrary, high leverage firms seem to make relatively greater use of 
cash flows as a source of finance during the crisis. Furthermore, our findings suggest that in 
contrast to leverage, cash holdings do not seem to be important for funding future investment 
opportunities (i.e. the cash flow sensitivity of investment does not differ substantially across 
HC and LC groups). This finding is consistent with recent qualitative evidence by Lins et al. 
(2010) suggesting that excess cash is usually held as a form of insurance against financial 
distress while lines of credit are held to fund future growth.  
Interestingly, these findings are not confirmed in our analysis covering the post crisis 
period. We therefore conclude that financial flexibility is an important determinant of 
                                                 
16
 Though we do not report the results in Table 4, we also repeat the same exercise for each of the HL, LL, HC, 
and LC subgroups by dropping the negative cash flow observations. Our findings prevail for all specifications. 
17
 Ding, Domac and Ferri (1998), for example, provide evidence on the existence of a credit crunch during the 
East Asian crisis.  
 22 
corporate investment but this result holds mainly during abnormal periods of the economic 
cycle.   
 
3.4.2 Financial Flexibility and Business Group Affiliation during the Crisis 
Business groups are diversifying organizations with a significant amount of ownership and 
control. Such groups can provide benefits to their affiliate firms through capital and product 
markets, contract enforcement, and government influence (see Khanna & Palepu, 2000; 
Rousseau and Kim, 2008). Recent evidence for East Asian (Korean) corporations, for 
example, supports a significant association between the existence of a business group and 
corporate debt policies (see Kang and Kim, 2006; Gul and Kealey, 1999). The questions that 
we try to address in this section are the following:  i) Does the investment expenditure of 
firms that belong to a business group (BG) exhibit a lower sensitivity to the availability of 
internal funds than that of firms without a business group affiliation (non-BG), ii) Does 
business group affiliation work as substitute to financial flexibility, as attained through cash 
and leverage, during the crisis? 
[Insert TABLE 5 about here] 
  To address the first question, we estimate equation (1) after splitting the sample into 
two subsamples based on their business group affiliation. The results from this estimation 
are reported in Panel A of Table 5. To address the second question, we estimate the 
investment model again by focusing on the subgroups based on a combination of the group 
affiliation and financial flexibility features of firms. For example, in Panel B of Table 6, 
Model 3 reports the estimation results using a subsample of firms that are defined as 
financially flexible and are also affiliated with a business group. On the other hand, Model 5 
in Panel C considers firms that are financially inflexible (HL-LC firms) and affiliated with a 
business group.  
The results presented in Panel A show that the cash flow sensitivity of investment is 
positive and statistically significant for both groups of firms, though the economic 
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significance of the coefficient on cash flow is greater for firms without a business group 
affiliation (0.142 vs. 0.073). This finding is consistent with the view that the investment of 
firms that belong to a business group is less dependent on the availability of cash flow. 
Another interesting finding, which is in line with our expectations, relates to the coefficient 
of the market to book ratio, which also plays a significant role for the BG firms in 
determining investment during the crisis period.18  
The results in Panel B, where we estimate the investment model for the BG and non 
BG firms with financial flexibility, reveal that the cash flow sensitivity of investment 
becomes insignificant when we consider only those BG firms with financial flexibility 
(Model 3). However, there is some evidence that the availability of internal funds may still 
be important in determining the ability of firms to invest even though they have financial 
flexibility through low leverage and high cash balances (Model 4). The economic 
significance of the estimated coefficient on cash flow is similar to that of Model 2 but the 
coefficient is only marginally significant. Although the findings in Panel B may suggest that 
establishing financial flexibility may not be sufficient on its own to eliminate the adverse 
effects of the crisis on investment, it is more important to analyze the impact of business 
group affiliation among the less flexible firms in order to draw more definite conclusions. 
We conduct this analysis in Models 5 and 6 in Panel C and find that the cash flow sensitivity 
of investment is positive and significant for the less flexible firms regardless of whether they 
are affiliated with a business group. Thus, in line with our earlier findings, financial 
flexibility appears to be the main determinant of whether the investment expenditures of 
firms are cash flow dependent during the crisis period. The economic significance of the 
estimated coefficients in both subsamples is also very similar.   
                                                 
18
 These findings, however, may be mainly driven by the economic conditions that characterized East Asian 
countries during the crisis period. To this end, an interesting avenue for future research would be the 
examination of the role of business groups in East Asia within a dynamic setting (i.e. before, during and after 
the crisis).  Indeed, recent studies that focus on Korean firms view the crisis of 1997/1998 as a structural break 
with respect to the investment behaviour and a shift towards stronger market orientation (see e.g. Rousseau and 
Kim, 2008).  
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Overall, the results of Table 5 suggest that companies cannot count solely on a 
business group affiliation to hedge against uncertain future contingencies, such as low 
profitability, low cash flow and/or high cost of external financing. Also, it seems that a 
sufficient level of financial flexibility can be attained through conservative leverage policies, 
even for firms that do not have a business group affiliation.19  
 
4. Financial Flexibility and Corporate Performance: Evidence from the Crisis 
Our analysis so far provides evidence that financial flexibility plays a crucial role in easing 
firms’ cash flow shortfalls and their adverse effects on investment during crisis periods. In 
this section we directly examine the performance consequences of establishing financial 
flexibility. The question that we aim to address is whether establishing financial flexibility in 
the pre crisis period enhances the relative performance of firms during the crisis period. 
In addressing this question we use three performance measures, namely Tobin’s Q, 
interest coverage ratio, and operating margin, as our dependent variables. These variables, 
which have been extensively used in studies that analyze the performance of East Asian 
firms prior and during the 1998 crisis (see Claessens et al., 2002; Allayannis, Brown and 
Klapper, 2003; Lemmon and Lins, 2003; Lins, 2003), are regressed on a number of 
independent variables including our main variable of interest, a dummy variable defining the 
flexibility status of firms in the pre crisis period. To control for the impact of corporate 
governance on performance, we follow Claessens et al. (2000) and include a set of dummy 
variables as explanatory variables in our performance equation. More specifically, these 
variables indicate whether: (i) ownership control rights of the largest owner exceed 
ownership cash flow rights (Control vs. C.F. Rights); (ii) a company is controlled through a 
pyramid structure (Pyramid); (iii) the largest shareholder is a widely held financial 
institution (Financial Owner); and (iv) the CEO, the board chairman or vice chairman are 
                                                 
19
 These results hold in models that use different proxies for flexibility (e.g. LL) and/or samples that exclude 
companies with negative cash flow observations (the results are available upon request). 
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part of the controlling owner (Managerial Ownership). To control for the important role that 
a business group affiliation can play on the performance of a company, we also include a 
dummy variable that takes the value of unity if a firm belongs to a business group and zero 
otherwise (Business Group). Finally, we also include the natural logarithm of total assets 
(Size), the ratio of capital expenditures to total assets (Investment), and the country’s rule of 
law score (Rule of Law) as control variables in the regression.  
Following Claessens et al. (2002), the estimation is conducted using a random effects 
GLS regression approach.20 To control for endogeneity problems, the dependent variable is 
measured at time t while for the independent variables lagged values are used. Specifically, 
business group affiliation, ownership dummies, rule of law measures and financial flexibility 
are measured at their pre crisis levels. For the remaining independent variables, namely size 
and investment, one year lagged values are used. The results of the performance model 
estimations are reported in Table 6. In Models 1, 3 and 5 financial flexibility is defined by 
using the low leverage criterion (LL), whereas in Models 2, 4 and 6 the flexibility definition 
is based on the low leverage and high cash criterion (LL-HC).  
[Insert TABLE 6 about here] 
Starting with Models 1 and 2, where firm performance is measured by Tobin’s Q, the 
results show a positive and statistically significant relationship between financial flexibility 
and performance under both definitions of flexibility. In economic terms, flexible firms 
indicate a much higher Tobin’s Q. than that of less flexible firms. We also find that firms 
that are affiliated with a business group are more likely to have a greater Tobin’s Q ratio 
than those without an affiliation. The results also reveal that the rule of law variable is 
positive and statistically significant in Models 1 and 2, suggesting that firms in countries 
with strong legal protection perform better than those firms in countries with weak legal 
protection of minority shareholders. This finding is consistent with La Porta et al. (2002) and 
                                                 
20
 The utilization of a fixed estimator is not possible given the static nature of some of the variables included in 
our performance model. For completeness, however, we have also carried out the estimation using a maximum 
likelihood estimator and obtained similar findings to the ones by the random effects estimator.   
 26 
Hossain, Lim and Tan (2010), who also report a strong association between legal protection 
and firm performance in their sample of 539 firms from 27 countries. The rest of the 
independent variables do not appear to have a statistically significant impact on the 
performance of firms during the crisis period.  
The results presented in Models 3 to 4 (for interest coverage ratio) and Models 5 to 6 
(for operating margin) are generally similar to the ones reported so far. Specifically, 
financial flexibility, business group and rule of law dummies affect performance positively.21 
However, there are also important differences. For example, the coefficient on the variable 
Pyramid is negative and statistically significant, possibly suggesting that firms controlled 
through a pyramid structure do not perform as well as the others during the crisis. Also, the 
results regarding the firm size are mixed. When we use the interest coverage ratio as the 
dependent variable the relationship between size and performance is negative and 
significant, whereas the relation becomes positive when performance is measured using the 
firm’s operating margin. Using the latter definition, we also observe that managerial 
ownership exerts a negative effect on firm performance, which is consistent with the view 
that firms with senior managers being part of the controlling owners exhibit inferior 
performance compared to firms that are run by independent senior managers. This implies 
that the entrenchment effects of large shareholdings by the CEO or Chairman may dominate 
the alignment incentive effect (see Claessens et al. 2002). Finally, in contrast to the results 
reported in Models 1 and 2, the findings indicate that firms with greater investment 
expenditures are also likely to perform better.  
                                                 
21
 We note that some caution should be taken when interpreting the coefficients on flexibility proxies in Models 
3 and 4. We are aware that the positive relationship between the interest coverage ratio and the (leverage) 
financial flexibility dummy is generated by construction. However, there are reasons why the endogeneity 
problem should not be as serious as one would suspect initially. First, notice that the flexibility measure is 
based on firms’ leverage positions in the pre crisis period and performance is observed during the crisis. 
Second, as reported earlier, low leverage, and hence flexible firms of the pre crisis period increase their 
leverage substantially, by about 44 percent, in the crisis period. Finally, the positive finding is also in line with 
the summary statistics regarding the cash flow ratio given that the LL and LL-HC firms have the lowest drops 
in their cash flows among all the subgroups of firms (see Table 3). 
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Among the remaining findings, it seems that the ownership variables, except for 
managerial ownership, do not appear to play a significant role in affecting firm performance 
of firms in the crisis period. Specifically, the estimated coefficients on Pyramid, Financial 
Owner and Control vs. C.F rights in models 5 and 6 are statistically insignificant, leading to 
the conclusion that agency problems between large and minority shareholders may not be 
among the key drivers of performance in the crisis period. This finding is in line with the 
results of Leung and Horwitz (2010) study, which focuses on the East Asian crisis and 
presents supportive evidence for the alignment theory of large managerial shareholdings. 
This evidence, however, is at odds with the findings of Claessens et al. (2002) who study the 
relationship between equity ownership and firm value in eight East Asian markets and find 
that the divergence between cash-flow ownership and control rights leads to a decrease in 
performance. The difference in findings may be partly attributed to the different samples and 
time-periods utilized across the two studies. For example, while Claessens et al. (2002) 
study the performance of firms in the pre crisis period, whereas our analysis focuses on the 
performance of firms during the crisis period. This explanation seems reasonable given the 
recent evidence by Wei and Zhang (2008) that the crisis altered the nature of agency 
problems in which Asian corporations are exposed to. It is then likely that the effectiveness 
of certain governance mechanisms/devices differs across different phases of the economic 
cycle (see Wei and Zhang, 2008; Leung and Horwitz, 2010). 
Overall, the findings reported in Table 6 suggest that a firm’s choice to establish 
financial flexibility and participate in a business group in the pre crisis period affects its 
performance positively during the crisis. However, flexibility through relatively high cash 
and low leverage policies, and group affiliation does not necessarily work as substitutes in 
helping firms to hedge against unexpected future contingencies. When we interact the 
financial flexibility proxies with the business group dummy and include the underlying 
interaction terms in the performance equation, the results indicate that the estimated 
coefficient on the interaction termsis statistically insignificant in most of the regressions (the 
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results are available upon request). Our findings reiterate earlier findings regarding the 
crucial role that financial flexibility can play during economic downturns. Also, the results 
emphasize the benefits of participating in a business group, which seem to materialize for all 
firms during a crisis period. In this respect, our study builds on the study of Claessens et al. 
(2006), which indicates that a group membership in the pre crisis period is beneficial only 
for mature firms with sluggish growth.   
We finally consider the possibility that the improved performance during the crisis 
period may arise from lower agency costs rather than the ability to exploit valuable 
investment opportunities that financial flexibility offers (although such explanations are not 
necessarily mutually exclusive). The fact that our performance models also include a set of 
corporate governance characteristics that may capture agency costs effects confirms that any 
performance differentials between flexibly and inflexible firms is more likely to be attributed 
to the different ability of each group to undertake profitable investment projects rather than 
agency costs. Such ability may of course be strongly linked with the fact that flexible firms 
have lower interest payment obligations. To further investigate the validity of this argument, 
we conduct the following check. We calculate the asset-turnover ratio (the ratio of total sales 
to total assets) of each firm and following Florackis and Ozkan (2009), we interpret it as an 
inverse proxy of expected agency costs. We then examine whether the agency cost 
differential between flexible and inflexible firms varies over time. Appropriate t-tests for 
differences in means suggest that the agency cost differential in the pre-crisis period is not 
statistically different from the agency cost differential in the crisis period [t=1.174; 
P(T≤t)=0.240] . We therefore conclude that the observed outperformance of financially 
flexible firms during the crisis period do not seem to be arising from lower agency costs in 
that period.22 Still, we acknowledge that an analysis considering optimal rather than 
observed levels of cash and leverage (see e.g. Frésard and Salva, 2010; Lee and Lee, 2009; 
                                                 
22
 We thank an anonymous reviewer for suggesting to explore and analyze this alternative interpretation of our 
findings.  
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Ozkan and Ozkan, 2004; Opler et al., 1999 on optimal cash and Morellec, 2004; Johnson, 
1998 on optimal leverage) would provide further insights into the link between financial 
flexibility, agency costs and firm value.  
 
5. Further Checks 
In the results reported so far we take financial flexibility as given without investigating 
explicitly whether low leverage and high cash policies in the pre crisis period are optimal or 
due to constraints arising from capital market imperfections. For example, we are aware of 
the possibility that firms hold large cash balances and/or low levels of debt in their capital 
structure because the cost of external finance is prohibitively high. Put differently, by using 
low leverage and high cash holdings ratios as our classification criteria, we may be picking 
up financially constrained firms and wrongly classifying them as financially flexible. For 
example, recent studies by Lins et al. (2008) and Hadlock and Pierce (2010), suggest that a 
high level of cash holdings may relate to financial constraints in the sense that firms hold 
elevated levels of cash for precautionary reasons. Another possibility is that hoarding cash is 
not the only way through which companies can establish financial flexibility. Lee et al. 
(2011) show that high growth firms can build up “precautionary reserves” for flexibility 
considerations through dividend policy (e.g. by reducing the payout ratio and retaining more 
earnings). Finally, it is also likely that the policies towards flexibility observed prior to the 
crisis are simply random despite the performance enhancing effects of such policies we 
observe during the crisis. To explore these possibilities we run several detailed checks.  
First, though we do not report the results in the paper, we estimate our baseline 
investment equation in the pre crisis period for constrained and unconstrained groups using 
firm characteristics such as size, age and dividend payout ratio. We find that, across all 
measures, the cash flow ratio of firms has a positive and significant impact on investment for 
both constrained and unconstrained firms, while the relationship between investment and the 
market to book ratio is weak. The extent to which the cash flow sensitivity of investment can 
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be used to determine financially constrained firms, we cannot find any firm characteristics 
which would enable us to distinguish between financially constrained and unconstrained 
firms in the pre crisis period. Our analyses suggest that neither the flexible nor the less 
flexible firms in our sample are likely to be constrained in the pre crisis period. The 
summary statistics we report in Sections 2 and 3 mostly support this view. Specifically, as 
noted earlier, the characteristics of the flexible firms in the crisis period are such that they 
have greater growth opportunities, are smaller, and have higher dividend payout, cash flow 
and investment ratios than the less flexible ones. The significant and persistent differences 
between the characteristics of flexible and inflexible firms in both periods also rule out the 
possibility that our classification of flexibility is driven by random behaviour of firms. 
As a second robustness check, we put forward an additional measure of flexibility in 
our analysis. Specifically, instead of simply looking at their cash and leverage policies at the 
onset of the crisis, we also look at the changes in cash holdings and leverage in order to 
classify firms into flexible and inflexible groups. Firms are classified as flexible ones if they 
have low leverage and high cash holdings at the onset of the crisis and, additionally, if their 
cash holdings ratio does not drop during the crisis. An appealing feature of such 
classification criterion is that it helps us distinguish between financially flexible from 
financial constrained firms; this is because financially constrained firms usually burn 
through their cash reserves to meet their liquidity needs during a crisis (see Campello et al., 
2010). Clearly, our groups of flexible firms (as defined above) are not likely to include any 
constrained firms as none of these groups includes firms that burn through their cash 
reserves. The results of our empirical analysis remain qualitatively similar when the new 
flexibility proxy is used. 
Another potential issue with our proxies for financial flexibility relates to the use of 
median values for classifying firms into flexible and less flexible categories. For robustness 
purposes, we estimate our investment and performance models again after using the 25% cut 
off point for the classification. Specifically, a firm is classified as flexible (less flexible) 
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under the leverage criterion if its leverage ratio lies in the first (fourth) quartile of the 
leverage distribution in the pre crisis period. Similarly, under the criterion that combines 
both leverage and cash holdings, a firm is characterized as flexible (less flexible) if its 
leverage ratio lies in the first (fourth) quartile of the leverage distribution and, also, its cash 
ratio lies in the fourth (first) quartile of the cash distribution in the pre crisis period. Once 
more the results are qualitatively similar to the ones reported so far. Specifically, flexible 
firms seem to be less dependent on internal resources during the crisis and, also, exhibit 
better performance than the others (see Panel A in Table 7 and Models 1, 4 and 7 in Table 
8).  
[Insert TABLE 7 about here] 
A further issue that needs investigation is the substitutability between cash and 
leverage when they are considered as attributes of financial flexibility. Our analysis so far 
provides some insights into the substitutability between the two variables by providing 
separate results for the cases when only cash, only leverage and both cash and leverage are 
used as classification criteria. Given the recent evidence by Acharya et al. (2007), which 
suggests that cash should not be viewed as negative debt in the presence of financing 
frictions, there is some scope for tackling the substitutability between cash and leverage in a 
more formal way. To do so, we use the KZ-Index to classify firms into flexible and less 
flexible groups. The main advantage of the KZ-Index is that it assigns different weights to 
the cash and leverage variables.23 Additionally, the index is composed of variables such as 
cash flow and dividends and, therefore, it explicitly controls for the possibility that flexibility 
can be established through dividend policy (e.g. by reducing the payout ratio and retaining 
more earnings) (see Lee et al., 2011).24 Firms are classified as flexible (less flexible) if they 
exhibit a small (large) KZ-Score based on median values. Such classification scheme seems 
                                                 
23
 Following Almeida et al. (2004) the KZ index is calculated using the following equation:  
gsCashHoldinDividendsLeverageQCashFlowIndexKZ *315.1*368.39*139.3*283.0*002.1 −−++−=−   
24
 Bhaduri (2008) further supports this argument by showing that low dividend payout firms are more likely to 
be confronted with financial constraints, when compared to their respective counterparts.  
 
 32 
reasonable given that firms assigned to the flexible group (low KZ firms) exhibit a lower 
leverage ratio, a higher cash holdings ratio and, also, pay higher dividends and generate 
more earnings (cash flow). These are among the main characteristics of flexible firms as 
classified by our earlier criteria (see descriptive analysis in Table 2). Based on such 
classifications, we repeat the estimation of the investment and performance equations. As 
shown in Panel B of Table 7, the cash flow sensitivity of investment is positive and 
statistically significant only in the case of less flexible firms. Also, consistent with our 
previous findings, the proxy for financial flexibility retains a positive and statistically 
significant coefficient in Models 2, 5 and 8 of Table 8. 
 
[Insert TABLE 8 about here] 
 
A final issue that we tackle in our analysis is that of persistence. The financial 
flexibility proxies used so far are based on average firm level information for cash and 
leverage over the period 1994-1996 (pre crisis period). However, it is possible that cash and 
leverage distributions evolve over time in a way that firms may be erroneously assigned to a 
specific group. For example, a particularly high leverage ratio for a firm in 1994 may 
contribute to a retentively high average leverage ratio for the 1994-1996 period, 
independently of whether the firm may have significantly dropped its leverage ratio close to 
the industry average in years 1995 and 1996 (just before the crisis). Although we partially 
control for this problem by using different cut off points (i.e. median values vs. 25% cut off 
points), an additional task is put forward to take into account the issue of persistence. 
Specifically, we classify firms into flexible (less flexible) if they display both low (high) 
leverage and high (low) cash for three consecutive years over the period 1994-1996. We then 
estimate the investment and performance equations again. Similar to the previous cases, the 
investment results do not differ materially from those reported so far. The performance 
results, however, are clearly weaker with the flexibility proxy being statistically significant 
only in Model 6 of Table 8. This finding is partly explained by the fact that the classification 
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criterion that is based on persistence is a rather strict criterion for classifying firms into 
different groups, leading most of them to be assigned to the less flexible group.  
 
 
6. Conclusions 
Using a large sample of firms from five East Asian countries, we investigate the impact of 
financial flexibility on corporate investment and performance over the period 1994-2006. 
We identify financially flexible firms on the basis of their past cash and leverage policies 
using several criteria. Our findings strongly suggest that financial flexibility appears to be an 
important determinant of investment, mainly during the 1997-1998 crisis.  
 Analytically, we provide evidence that leverage is the most important component of 
financial flexibility. While a low leverage policy at the onset of the crisis appears to be 
particularly useful in financing investment expenditures during the crisis, it seems that most 
of our firms in our sample do not spend cash reserves to fund future growth but, rather, use it 
as a form of insurance against financial distress. We find that financially flexible firms invest 
more than less flexible firms during the crisis. Moreover, the sensitivity of the investment 
expenditures of flexible firms to the availability of internal funds is lower than that of the 
less flexible firms. Interestingly, our analysis for the post crisis period does not reveal any 
significant differentials in investment behaviour of flexible and inflexible firms. Finally, the 
current analysis also suggests that, during abnormal periods of the economic cycle, 
traditional measures of financial constraints (e.g. business group affiliation, size, age and 
dividend payouts) are less useful predictors of corporate investment behavior than the simple 
flexibility proxies utilized in this study. 
Overall, our results complement and extend those of previous studies on corporate 
investment and performance. In particular, we present strong evidence that less flexible firms 
are more vulnerable to sudden drops in their cash flows. More importantly, we find that 
while the leverage policy and to a lesser extent the cash holding policy of firms are decisive 
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determinants of financial flexibility, business group affiliation of firms play a modest role in 
maintaining corporate investment at a satisfactory level during the crisis period. These 
findings reduce the ambiguity in the use of the term financial flexibility in the literature, as 
mentioned in a recent survey by Byoun (2011). In particular, if financial flexibility is defined 
as the ability of a firm to access and restructure its financing to cope with uncertain future 
contingencies, the group of firms with the highest ability to do so is that of relatively low 
leverage and high cash. Additionally, our findings complement the ones of Duchin et al., 
(2010), who focus on the subprime mortgage credit crisis and observe substantial declines in 
the investment of firms with low cash reserves and high short-term debt. Finally, our 
analysis builds on existing studies that analyze the factors that affect corporate performance 
during the East Asian crisis (see, e.g., Johnson et. al, 2000; Mitton, 2002; Fisman, 2002; 
Lemmon and Lins, 2003; Lins, 2003). In particular, our paper presents overwhelming 
evidence that in addition to several corporate governance characteristics, financial flexibility 
constitutes an important driver of firm performance during economic downturns.  
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List of Tables 
Table 1 
Descriptive statistics for the whole sample 
This table presents descriptive statistics for the whole sample of 1,068 firms. Pre crisis period (Panel A) includes the years 1994, 1995 and 1996, 
crisis period (Panel B) includes the years 1997 and 1998 and post crisis period (Panel C) includes the years from 1999 to 2006. Investment is 
measured as the ratio of capital expenditures to total assets. CFLOW is the sum of earnings before interest, tax and depreciation over total assets. 
MTB is the ratio of the book value of total assets minus the book value of equity plus the market value of equity to the book value of assets. Size is 
USD currency adjusted total assets. Leverage is the ratio of total debt to total assets. Cash is the ratio of cash and equivalents to total assets. Net 
Debt is the difference between Leverage and Cash ratios. Dividend is the ratio of total dividends to total assets. Tangibility is measured as the ratio 
of tangible assets to total assets. Finally, Short Debt is the ratio of short term debt to total debt. 
  
                Panel A: Pre Crisis Period                                         Panel B: Crisis Period                                    Panel C: Post Crisis Period                       
  Mean Median Min. Max.                  Mean Median Min. Max. Mean Median Min. Max. 
Investment 0.0810 0.0635 0.000 0.5903 0.0415        0.0258 0 0.3463 0.0411 0.0247 0 0.4601 
CFLOW 0.0999 0.0913 -0.1277 0.7615 0.0691 0.0642 -0.6298 0.5199 0.0702 0.0656 -0.4969 0.6217 
MTB 1.5676 1.2244 0.2109 15.289 1.1864 0.9505 0.1726 11.984 1.1389 0.9389 0.0606 14.682 
Size 12.439 12.298 7.9083 17.492 12.329 12.253 7.1736 17.706 12.472 12.343 7.276 18.423 
Leverage 0.2925 0.2831 0 0.8544 0.3467 0.3237 0 1 0.2557 0.2349 0 1 
Cash 0.1115 0.0731 0.0002 0.7479 0.1114 0.0720 0.0004 0.8328 0.1271 0.0881 0 1 
Net Debt 0.1810 0.2110 -0.0002 0.1065 0.2353 0.2517 -0.0004 0.1672 0.1279 0.1346 -0.0001 0.9839 
Dividend 0.0201 0.0126 0 0.2727 0.0127 0.0021 0 0.6064 0.0179 0.0051 0 0.8781 
Tangibility 0.4087 0.3942 0 0.9653 0.4391 0.4294 0 1.1672 0.4112 0.4006 0 0.9969 
Short Debt 0.5909 0.5935 0 1 0.6041 0.6071 0 1 0.5630 0.5553 0 1 
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Table 2 
Descriptive statistics for different subgroups of firms 
This table presents descriptive statistics for the following subgroups of firms (all classifications are based on 
median values): high leverage (HL) firms; low leverage (LL) firms; high cash (HC) firms; low cash (LC) firms; 
low leverage and high cash (LL-HC) firms; high leverage and low cash (HL-LC) firms. Pre crisis period (Panel 
A) includes the years 1994, 1995 and 1996, crisis period (Panel B) includes the years 1997 and 1998 and post 
crisis period (Panel C) includes the years from 1999 to 2006. Investment is measured as the ratio of capital 
expenditures to total assets. CFLOW is sum of earnings before interest, tax and depreciation over total assets. 
MTB is the ratio of book value of total assets minus the book value of equity plus the market value of equity to 
book value of assets. Size is USD currency adjusted total assets. Leverage is the ratio of total debt to total assets. 
Cash is the ratio of cash and equivalents to total assets. Net Debt is the difference between Leverage and Cash 
ratios. Dividend is the ratio of total dividends to total assets. Tangibility is measured as the ratio of tangible assets 
to total assets. Finally, Short Debt is ratio of short term debt to total debt. 
 
  
Panel A: Pre Crisis Period 
 
(A.1) (A.2) (A.3) 
  
HL 
firms 
LL 
firms t-test 
HC 
firms 
LC 
firms t-test 
LL-HC 
firms 
HL-LC 
firms t-test 
Investment 0.0856 0.0764     -2.17** 0.0803 0.0818    -0.31 0.0752 0.0842    -1.71* 
CFLOW 0.0834 0.1160      7.45*** 0.1081 0.0916     3.70*** 0.1230 0.0808     6.92*** 
MTB 1.4358 1.6998      3.73*** 1.6885 1.4488     3.37*** 1.8486 1.4182     4.39*** 
Size 12.656 12.227     -4.88*** 12.432 12.442    -0.11 12.190 12.572    -3.29*** 
Leverage 0.4249 0.1605   -33.76*** 0.2562 0.3283    -6.52*** 0.1451 0.4332  -27.57*** 
Cash 0.0852 0.1379      8.18*** 0.1848 0.0383    29.96*** 0.2079 0.0374   24.73*** 
Net Debt 0.3397 0.0226 -28.02*** 0.0714 0.2901 -16.40*** -0.0628 0.3958 -32.45*** 
Dividend 0.0127 0.0272    10.17*** 0.0230 0.0170     4.09*** 0.0290 0.0113     9.09*** 
Tangibility 0.4137 0.4040     -0.72 0.3574 0.4609    -8.00*** 0.3501 0.4474    -5.98*** 
Short Debt 0.5483 0.6355      5.18*** 0.5859 0.5961    -0.60 0.6328 0.5652     3.11*** 
 
Panel B: Crisis Period 
 
(B.1) (B.2) (B.3) 
  
HL 
firms 
LL 
firms t-test 
HC 
firms 
LC 
firms t-test 
LL-HC 
firms 
HL-LC 
Firms t-test 
Investment 0.0373 0.0456     2.89** 0.0433 0.0397     1.26 0.0467 0.0365    2.70*** 
CFLOW 0.0553 0.0831     4.54*** 0.0765 0.0617     2.40** 0.0871 0.0513    4.57*** 
MTB 1.1621 1.2033     0.66 1.2495 1.1228     2.02** 1.3091 1.1580    1.65 
Size 12.530 12.139    -4.05*** 12.370 12.287     0.85 12.167 12.441   -2.17** 
Leverage 0.4630 0.2307  -17.65*** 0.3115 0.3823    -4.77*** 0.2057 0.4649 -15.44** 
Cash 0.0876 0.1350     7.05*** 0.1513 0.0706    12.64*** 0.1732 0.0626   13.14*** 
Net Debt 0.3754 0.1020 -16.90*** 0.1602 0.3117 -8.29*** 0.0325 0.4023 -17.47*** 
Dividend 0.0059 0.0194     7.34*** 0.0155 0.0098     3.03*** 0.0213 0.0050    7.95*** 
Tangibility 0.4456 0.4323    -0.98 0.4032 0.4764    -5.44 0.3925 0.4666   -4.25*** 
Short Debt 0.5803 0.6275     2.58** 0.6110 0.5975     0.73 0.6298 0.5756    2.23** 
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Table 2 (continued) 
Descriptive statistics for different subgroups of firms 
 
 
Panel C: Post Crisis Period 
 
(C.1) (C.2) (C.3) 
  
HL 
firms 
LL 
firms t-test 
HC 
firms 
LC 
firms t-test 
LL-HC 
firms 
HL-LC 
Firms t-test 
Investment 0.0427 0.0401 2.43** 0.0431 0.0390 3.77*** 0.0419 0.0411 0.61 
CFLOW 0.0606 0.0826 -10.77*** 0.0833 0.0572 12.70*** 0.0945 0.0566 14.77*** 
MTB 1.0864 1.1468 -3.34*** 1.2406 1.0376 10.68*** 1.2603 1.0461 8.92*** 
Size 12.745 12.247 13.84*** 12.464 12.478 -0.38 12.215 12.628 -9.54*** 
Leverage 0.4198 0.0916 120.1*** 0.1934 0.3186 -29.39*** 0.0774 0.4328 -106.6*** 
Cash 0.0856 0.1699 -31.58*** 0.2156 0.0386 87.20*** 0.2422 0.0374 72.76*** 
Net Debt 0.3342 -0.0784 100.2*** -0.0224 0.2798 -58.74*** -0.1647 0.3954 -119.5*** 
Dividend 0.0086 0.0278 -21.31*** 0.0250 0.0107 15.90*** 0.0336 0.0074 20.82*** 
Tangibility 0.4496 0.370 16.23*** 0.3416 0.4808 -29.61*** 0.3201 0.4908 -30.10*** 
Short Debt 0.5034 0.6339 -17.75*** 0.5759 0.5511 3.32*** 0.6496 0.5217 13.84*** 
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Table 3 
Percentage changes of key variables from pre crisis to crisis period for different 
subgroups of firms  
This table presents percentage changes of key variables from pre crisis to crisis period for the 
following subgroups of firms (all classifications are based on median values): high leverage (HL) 
firms; low leverage (LL) firms; high cash (HC) firms; low cash (LC) firms; low leverage and high 
cash (LL-HC) firms; high leverage and low cash (HL-LC) firms. Pre crisis period (Panel A) includes 
the years 1994, 1995 and 1996, crisis period (Panel B) includes the years 1997 and 1998 and post 
crisis period (Panel C) includes the years from 1999 to 2006. Investment is measured as the ratio of 
capital expenditures to total assets. CFLOW is the sum of earnings before interest, tax and 
depreciation over total assets. MTB is the ratio of book value of total assets minus the book value of 
equity plus the market value of equity to book value of assets. Size is USD currency adjusted total 
assets. Leverage is the ratio of total debt to total assets. Cash is the ratio of cash and equivalents to 
total assets. Net Debt is the difference between Leverage and Cash ratios. Dividend is the ratio of 
dividends to total assets. Tangibility is measured as the ratio of tangible assets to total assets. Short 
Debt is ratio of short term debt to total debt. Finally, ∆ symbolises the change, while ↑ and ↓ denote 
increase and decrease respectively. 
 
 Panel A: Changes from Pre Crisis to Crisis Period 
  
HL 
firms 
LL  
firms 
HC  
firms 
LC  
firms 
LL-HC 
firms 
HL-LC 
firms 
∆ in Investment 56.43  ↓  40.31 ↓ 46.08 ↓ 51.47 ↓ 37.90 ↓ 56.65 ↓ 
∆ in CFLOW 33.69  ↓  28.36 ↓ 29.23 ↓ 32.64 ↓ 29.19 ↓ 36.51 ↓ 
∆ in MTB 
    19.06  ↓  29.21 ↓ 26.00 ↓ 13.76 ↓ 29.18 ↓ 18.35 ↓ 
∆ in Size 
      1.00  ↓    0.72 ↓  0.50 ↓   1.25 ↓   0.19 ↓  1.04 ↓ 
∆ in Leverage 
  8.97  ↑  43.74 ↑ 21.59 ↑ 16.45 ↑ 41.76 ↑  7.32 ↑ 
∆ in Cash 
  2.82  ↑    2.10 ↓ 18.13 ↓ 84.33 ↑ 16.69 ↓     67.38↑ 
∆ in Net Debt 
    10.51 ↑ 351.3 ↑ 124.4 ↑  7.41 ↑ 152.8 ↑ 1.64 ↑ 
∆ in Dividend 
    53.54  ↓  28.68 ↓ 32.61 ↓ 42.35 ↓ 26.55 ↓ 55.75 ↓ 
∆ in Tangibility 
   7.71 ↑    7.00 ↑ 12.81 ↑   3.36 ↑ 12.11 ↑  4.29 ↑ 
∆ in Short Debt 
   5.84  ↑    1.26 ↓  4.28 ↑   0.23 ↑   0.47 ↓  1.84 ↑ 
 Panel B: Changes from Crisis to Post Crisis Period 
∆ in Investment 14.48  ↑ 12.06  ↓      0.46 ↓ 1.76  ↓ 10.28 ↓ 12.60  ↑ 
∆ in CFLOW 9.58  ↑ 0.60  ↓      8.89 ↑ 7.29  ↓ 8.50 ↑ 10.33  ↑ 
∆ in MTB 6.5  1 4.70  ↓      0.71 ↓ 7.59  ↓ 3.73 ↓ 9.66  ↓ 
∆ in Size 1.72  ↑ 0.89  ↑      0.76 ↑ 1.55  ↑ 0.39 ↑ 1.50  ↑ 
∆ in Leverage 9.33  ↓ 60.29  ↓      37.9 ↓   16.66  ↓ 62.37 ↓ 6.90  ↓ 
∆ in Cash 2.28  ↓ 25.85  ↑    42.50 ↑ 45.33  ↓ 39.84 ↑ 40.26  ↓ 
∆ in Net Debt 10.97  ↓ 176.86  ↓   113.98↓ 10.23  ↓ 606.77 ↓ 1.72  ↓ 
∆ in Dividend 45.76  ↑ 43.30  ↑    61.29 ↑ 9.18  ↑ 57.75 ↑ 48.00  ↑ 
∆ in Tangibility 0.90  ↑ 14.41  ↓    15.28 ↓ 0.92  ↑ 18.45 ↓ 5.19  ↑ 
∆ in Short Debt 13.25  ↓ 1.02  ↑      5.74 ↓ 7.77  ↓ 3.14 ↑ 9.36  ↓ 
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Table 4 
The cash flow sensitivity of investment across different subgroups of firms 
This table shows the cash flow sensitivity of investment for the following subgroups of firms: ALL firms, high leverage (HL) firms; low leverage (LL) firms; high 
cash (HC) firms; low cash (LC) firms; low leverage and high cash (LL-HC FIRMS I) firms; high leverage and low cash (HL-LC FIRMS I) firms; low leverage and 
high cash  firms with positive cash flows (LL-HC FIRMS II); high leverage and low cash firms with positive cash flows (HL-LC FIRMS II). I (investment) is 
measured as the ratio of capital expenditures to lagged total assets. CFLOW is sum of earnings before interest, tax and depreciation over total assets. MTB is 
decomposed into two parts - a fundamental component, MTBf, and a residual component, MTBr (see Section 4 for details). t-statistic values are reported in 
parentheses. ***, ** and * indicate coefficient is significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively. 
 
 PANEL A: PRE CRISIS PERIOD  PANEL B: CRISIS PERIOD 
Dependent Variable Independent Variables               Independent Variables 
I (investment) CFLOW MTBf MTBr Constant R2 N  CFLOW MTBf MTBr Constant R2 N 
1) ALL FIRMS 0.289     0.002 0.002 0.095 0.07 1504 
       0.087      0.031      0.030      0.009 0.07 2035 
 
   (6.49)***    (0.80)    (0.87)   (8.51)***   
      (4.32)***     (8.00)***     (9.19)***     (1.29)   
2) HL FIRMS     0.273     0.149     0.013    -0.168 0.08 724 
       0.114      0.001      0.017      0.027 0.05 1007 
 
  (3.33)***    (2.83)***  (2.32)**   (-1.71)*   
      (4.47)***     (0.06)     (2.82)***     (0.058)   
3) LL FIRMS     0.369    -0.001    -0.001      0.093 0.16 778 
       0.038      0.038      0.037      0.005 0.09 1024 
 
  (7.61)***   (-0.44)   (-0.28)     (8.06)***   
      (1.17)     (8.14)***     (8.98)***     (0.45)   
4) HC FIRMS    0.275     0.0001      0.0001      0.081 0.04 687 
 
   0.090      0.039      0.037     -0.018 0.10 1009 
 
(3.90)***    (0.03)    (0.03)     (4.36)***   
      (2.92)**     (8.29)***     (9.04)***    (-1.92)*   
5) LC FIRMS 0.281     0.016     0.007 0.055 0.11 815        0.081      0.001      0.017      0.029 0.04 1022 
 
(4.99)***    (1.50)  (2.15)**     (3.12)***   
      (3.04)***     (0.05)     (3.01)***     (1.20)   
6) LL-HC FIRMS I 0.348    -0.003    -0.003 0.078 0.13 380 
       0.035      0.048      0.046      0.005 0.13 590 
 
(5.25)***   (-0.76)   (-0.67)     (4.00)***   
      (0.76)     (8.29)***     (8.97)***     (0.32)   
7) HL-LC FIRMS I 0.250     0.155 0.009 -0.133 0.10 417        0.101      0.003      0.030      0.059 0.05 586 
 
(2.89)***    (2.36)** (1.68)*    (-1.40)   
      (2.92)***     (0.14).     (3.24)***     (0.60)   
8) LL-HC FIRMS II 0.377    -0.005    -0.005 0.086 0.11 362 
       0.022      0.184      0.042     -0.196 0.14 541 
 
(4.80)***   (-1.32)   (-1.23)     (5.18)***   
      (0.41)     (3.80)***      (7.64)***    (-2.99)***   
9) HL-LC FIRMS II 0.267     0.161 0.007     -0.205 0.10 405        0.126      0.178       0.029     -0.233 0.05 508 
  
(2.88)**    (2.36)**     (1.20)    (-1.60)   
      (2.73)***     (3.27)***      (2.58)***    (-3.06)***   
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Table 4 (continued) 
The cash flow sensitivity of investment across different subgroups of firms 
 
 PANEL C: POST CRISIS PERIOD 
Dependent Variable Independent Variables 
I (investment) CFLOW MTBf MTBr Constant R2 N 
1) ALL FIRMS 0.129     0.063 0.008 -2.079 0.17 6905 
 
 
   (17.21)***   (6.58)***   (6.25)***   (-3.81)***   
 
2) HL FIRMS     0.137     0.080     0.009    -4.193 0.18 3434  
 
  (12.60)***  (5.87)***  (4.46)***   (-5.35)***   
 
3) LL FIRMS     0.126    0.061    0.008      0.154 0.18 3367 
 
 
  (11.27)***   (4.26)*** (4.71)***     (0.19)   
 
4) HC FIRMS    0.117     0.059      0.007      -0.911 0.14 3417 
 
 
(11.07)***   (4.19)***   (4.04)***     (-1.10)   
 
5) LC FIRMS 0.149     0.067     0.008 -3.728 0.21 3488  
 
(14.29)***   (5.14)***  (4.49)***     (-4.41)***   
 
6) LL-HC FIRMS I 0.111    0.064    0.007 0.988 0.14 2146 
 
 
(7.93)***   (3.52)***   (3.45)***     (0.94)   
 
7) HL-LC FIRMS I 0.1445     0.084 0.009 -4.191 0.19 2192 
 
 
(10.41)***   (5.05)*** (3.44)***    (-4.31)***   
 
8) LL-HC FIRMS II 0.150    0.104    0.006 0.369 0.14 1908  
 
(8.22)***   (4.60)***   (2.35)**     (0.31)   
 
9) HL-LC FIRMS II 0.247     0.103 0.004     -5.539 0.18 1800 
 
  
(11.20)***   (4.86)***     (1.36)    (-4.77)***   
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Table 5 
The cash flow sensitivity of investment across different subgroups of firms:  
Evidence from the 1997-1998 crisis 
This table shows the cash flow sensitivity of investment for different subgroups of firms. I (investment) 
is measured as the ratio of capital expenditures to lagged total assets. CFLOW is sum of earnings before 
interest, tax and depreciation over total assets. MTB is decomposed into two parts - a fundamental 
component, MTBf, and a residual component, MTBr (see Section 4 for details). BG_Firms are the firms 
with a business group affiliation just before the start of the crisis.  Non BG_Firms are the firms without 
a business group affiliation just before the start of the crisis. LL-HC FIRMS are the firms that combine 
low leverage and high cash.  HL-LC FIRMS are the firms that combine high leverage and low cash. t-
statistic values are reported in parentheses. ***, ** and * indicate coefficient is significant at the 1%, 
5% and 10% level respectively. 
 CRISIS PERIOD (1997-1998) 
Dependent Variable Independent Variables 
I (investment) CFLOW MTBf MTBr Constant R2 N 
Panel A 
1)  BG_Firms 0.073     0.062      0.040       -0.027 0.14 934 
 
  (2.37)**    (2.70)***    (9.49)***      (-0.66)   
2)  Non BG_Firms 0.142     0.044      0.010       -0.020 0.11 539 
 
     (4.29)***    (1.26)     (1.61)    (-4.51)***   
Panel B   
3)  BG_Firms & LL-HC firms -0.007     0.178 0.055 -0.205 0.26 252 
 
     (-0.10)    (3.27)***     (7.82)***      (2.76)***   
4)  Non BG_Firms & LL-HC firms 0.124     0.045       0.008       -0.009 0.10 167 
 
(1.97)*    (0.66)      (0.69)      (-0.10)   
Panel C   
5)  BG_Firms & HL-LC firms 0.153   -0.005       0.037 0.040 0.12 278 
 
     (3.33)*** (-0.17)     (3.42)***       (1.01)   
6)  Non BG_Firms & HL-LC firms 0.166   0.126      0.045       -0.123 0.17 131 
 
     (2.98)***   (1.67)*   (2.93)***      (-1.27)   
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Table 6 
Performance of firms during the crisis period 
This table presents the results from our performance models. Tobin’s Q is measured as the ratio of book value of 
total assets minus the book value of equity plus the market value of equity to book value of assets. Interest 
Coverage Ratio is measured as earnings before interest and tax dividend by interest expense. Operating Margin 
is obtained by dividing operating income to sales. In models 1, 3 and 5 (2, 4 and 6) Flexibility is a dummy 
variable that takes the value of 1 if the firms belongs to the LL (or LL-HC) group and zero otherwise at the onset 
of the crisis. Investment is measured as the ratio of investment in fixed assets to total assets. Business Group is a 
dummy variable that takes the value of unity if the firm belongs to a business group and zero otherwise. Pyramid 
is a dummy variable indicating whether the firm is controlled through a pyramid structure. Financial Owner is a 
dummy variable indicating whether the largest shareholder is a widely held financial institution or not. Control 
vs. C.F. Rights is a dummy variable that takes the value of unity if control rights of the largest owner exceed cash 
flow rights and zero otherwise. Managerial Ownership is a dummy variable if the CEO, the board chairman or 
vice chairman are part of the controlling owner. Rule of Law is a score that ranges from 0 to 11, lower scores 
corresponding to less tradition to law and order. Finally, Size is the USD currency adjusted total assets. t-statistic 
values are reported in parentheses. ***, ** and * indicate coefficient is significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% level 
respectively.  
 
 Dependent Variable= 
Tobin’Q 
Dependent Variable= 
Interest Coverage Ratio 
Dependent Variable= 
Operating Margin 
Independent Variables Model 
(1) 
Model 
(2) 
Model 
(3) 
Model 
(4) 
Model 
(5) 
Model 
(6) 
Flexibility (LL) 
 
     0.140 
    (2.13)** 
    - 
 
     2.123 
    (8.02)*** 
- 
 
    0.023 
    (2.43)** 
 
- 
 
Flexibility (LL-HC) -      0.253 
    (3.47)*** - 
    2.369 
    (8.00)*** - 
   0.018 
   (1.68)* 
Investment      0.566 
    (1.13) 
     0.549 
    (1.10) 
     5.195 
    (2.89)*** 
    5.266 
    (2.93)*** 
     0.134 
    (2.28)** 
    0.136 
   (2.31)** 
Business Group     0.159 
  (2.05)** 
     0.167 
    (2.17)** 
     0.718 
    (2.30)** 
    0.822 
    (2.63)*** 
    0.022 
    (1.95)* 
   0.024 
    (2.04)** 
Pyramid     -0.012 
   (-0.10) 
    -0.010 
   (-0.08) 
    -1.181 
   (-2.24)** 
  -1.208 
   (-2.29)** 
   -0.033 
    (-1.69)* 
  -0.033 
  (-1.72)* 
Financial Owner      0.025 
    (0.15) 
     0.022 
    (0.13) 
     0.216 
    (0.32) 
    0.161 
    (0.24) 
    -0.013 
    (-0.55) 
   -0.014 
    (-0.58) 
Control vs. C.F. Rights     -0.093 
   (-0.74) 
    -0.104 
   (-0.84) 
     0.511 
    (1.01) 
    0.456 
    (0.90) 
    0.018 
    (0.98) 
   0.018 
  (0.98) 
Managerial Ownership     -0.524 
   (-0.74) 
     0.009 
    (0.11) 
    -0.481 
   (-1.45) 
    -0.524 
   (-1.59) 
   -0.026 
   (-2.17)** 
   -0.007 
  (-2.17)** 
Rule of Law     0.104 
    (2.77)*** 
     0.106 
    (2.93)*** 
      0.785 
    (5.22)*** 
    0.944 
     (6.48)*** 
   -0.010 
   (-1.46) 
   -0.008 
  (-1.45) 
Size     0.003 
    (0.16) 
     0.003 
    (0.14) 
     -0.327 
   (-3.65)*** 
   -0.327 
   (-3.65)*** 
    0.015 
    (4.52)*** 
    0.014 
   (4.27)*** 
Number of Observations        1,010     1,010      1,010 1,010       1,010      1,010 
Adjusted R2  0.037      0.048     0.1935 0.1935 0.103 0.098 
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Table 7 
The cash flow sensitivity of investment across different flexibility subgroups 
This table shows the cash flow sensitivity of investment for different flexibility subgroups of firms. In Panel A, a 
firm is characterized as LL-HC (HL-LC) if its leverage ratio lies in the first (fourth) quartile of the leverage 
distribution, and, also its cash ratio lies in the fourth (first) quartile of the cash distribution. In Panel B, the 
classification of the firms is based on the median values of the KZ-Index which is calculated as −1.002* CashFlow 
+ 0.283*Q + 3.139 *Leverage − 39.368*Dividends − 1.315*CashHolding. Flexible Firms (Inflexible Firms) are the 
ones that exhibit a small (large) KZ-score (based on median values). Panel C focuses on the persistency of firms in 
adopting and retaining a specific policy. Specifically, a firm is called as LL-HC (HL-LC) if it displays both low 
(high) leverage and high (low) cash for the three consecutive years of 1994, 1995 and 1996. I (investment) is 
measured as the ratio of capital expenditures to lagged total assets. CFLOW is sum of earnings before interest, 
tax and depreciation over total assets. MTB is decomposed into two parts - a fundamental component, MTBf, and a 
residual component, MTBr (see Section 4 for details). t-statistic values are reported in parentheses. ***, ** and * 
indicate coefficient is significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively. 
Dependent Variable Independent Variables 
I (investment) CFLOW MTBf MTBr Constant R2 N 
Panel A: 25th & 75th Percentiles       
1) LL-HC FIRMS -0.072 0.178 0.058 -0.119 0.25 218 
      (-0.88)      (2.89)***      (7.45)*** (-1.79)*   
2) HL-LC FIRMS 0.157 0.154 0.009 -0.129 0.08 177 
    (2.37)**  (1.66)* (0.47) (-1.35)   
Panel B: KZ-Index       
1) FLEXIBLE FIRMS 0.050 0.040 0.038 0.014 0.09 988 
 (1.40)      (7.86)***      (8.58)*** (1.02)   
2) LESS FLEXIBLE FIRMS 0.095 0.003 0.020 0.047 0.05 967 
      (3.80)*** (0.16)      (3.24)***      (2.77)***   
Panel C: Persistency       
1) LL-HC FIRMS 0.079 0.031 0.031 0.029 0.25 139 
 (1.33)      (4.05)***     (4.05)***    (2.08)**   
2) HL-LC FIRMS 0.081 0.055 0.004 0.002 0.06 876 
       (3.00)***    (2.00)** (0.75) (0.07)   
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 Table 8 
Performance of firms during the crisis period across different flexibility subgroups 
This table presents the results from the performance models as estimated across the different flexibility subgroups of firms. In models 1, 4, 7; LL-HC (25th & 75th 
Percentiles) is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 for firms that have their leverage ratio lying in the first quartile of the leverage distribution, and, also their cash ratio lying 
in the fourth quartile of the cash distribution, and zero otherwise. In models 2, 5, 8; LL- HC (Persistence) is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 for firms that fit into the 
category of low leverage and high cash for the three consecutive years of 1994, 1995 and 1996, and zero otherwise. In models 3, 6, 9; Flexibility (KZ-Index) is a dummy variable that 
takes the value of 1 for firms that exhibit a below median KZ-score, which is measured as −1.002* CFLOW + 0.283*Q + 3.139 *Leverage − 39.368*Dividends 
− 1.315*CashHolding, and zero otherwise. Analytical definitions for the variables Tobin’s Q, Interest Coverage Ratio, Operating Margin, Investment, Business Group, Financial 
Owner, Control vs. C.F. Rights, Managerial Ownership, Rule of Law and Size are provided in Table 6. t-statistic values are reported in parentheses. ***, ** and * indicate coefficient 
is significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively. 
 
Dependent Variable: 
Tobin’s Q 
Dependent Variable: 
Interest Coverage Ratio 
Dependent Variable: 
Operating Margin 
Independent Variables Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) Model (4) Model (5) Model (6) Model (7) Model (8) Model (9) 
LL- HC (25th & 75th Percentiles) 0.432 - - 3.417 - - 0.042 - - 
     (4.01)***       (7.76)***       (2.62)***   
LL- HC (Persistence) - - 0.187 - - 2.142 - - -0.006 
   (1.48)      (4.03)***   (-0.31) 
Flexibility (KZ-Index) - 0.121 - - 2.882 - - 0.045 - 
  (1.75)*       (10.40)***       (4.25)***  
Investment 0.564 0.600 0.605 5.408 5.130 5.375 0.136 0.133 0.140 
       (1.13) (1.21) (1.20)     (3.00)***     (2.89)***     (2.94)***   (2.31)**   (2.22)**   (2.38)** 
Business Group 0.151 0.147 0.160 0.698 0.864 0.746 0.022 0.024 0.023 
    (1.97)**   (1.98)**    (2.05)**   (2.23)**     (2.88)***   (2.28)** (1.92)*   (2.11)**   (2.03)** 
Pyramid       -0.018 0.014 -0.030 -1.289 -1.264 -1.417 -0.034 -0.034 -0.034 
 (-0.14) (0.11) (-0.23)    (-2.44)**  (-2.53)**   (-2.57)** (-1.75)* (-1.77)* (-1.75)* 
Financial Owner 0.047 0.043 0.008 0.358 0.439 0.002 -0.012 -0.011 -0.014 
 (0.29) (0.27) (0.05) (0.53) (0.69) (0.00) (-0.48) (-0.45) (-0.56) 
Control vs. C.F. Rights -0.062 -0.075 -0.081 0.826 0.636 0.691 0.022 0.018 0.020 
 (-0.50) (-0.63) (-0.64) (1.62) (1.32) (1.30) (1.18) (0.99) (1.06) 
Managerial Ownership 0.001 -0.045 -0.012 -0.632 -0.542 -0.705 -0.028 -0.028 -0.030 
 (0.01) (-0.58) (-0.15) (-1.91)* (-1.72)*   (-2.05)**   (-2.30)**   (-2.35)**    (-2.47)** 
Rule of Law 0.102 0.123 0.128 0.947 1.008 1.149 -0.009 -0.008 -0.006 
      (2.83)***      (3.56)***      (3.54)***     (6.48)***     (7.32)***      (7.69)*** (-1.64) (-1.48) (-1.15) 
Size 0.008 0.001 -0.006 -0.365 -0.335 -0.476 0.014 0.015 0.013 
 (0.35) (0.04) (-0.27)     (-4.10)***     (-3.94)***      (-5.20)***      (4.48)***      (4.65)***     (4.08)*** 
Number of Observations 1,010 986 1,010 1,010 986 1,010 1,010 986 1,010 
 Adjusted R2 0.053 0.037 0.034 0.190 0.250 0.130 0.104 0.127 0.094 
 
 
